Subject: [SocialistWorker.org] Never a force for good
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http://socialistworker.org/2011/04/05/never-a-force-for-good
Column: Paul D'Amato
======== NEVER A FORCE FOR GOOD ==============================================
No struggle for liberation and democracy has ever benefited from U.S.
military intervention--because Washington's wars come at the price of
perverting those aims.
April 5, 2011
THE UNITED States has a history of presenting its motives for military
intervention in a good light--spreading democracy, fighting terrorism,
deposing unpopular tyrants, protecting civilians and saving lives.
In each case, the reasons the U.S. has concocted for public consumption to
explain its decision to take military action differ substantially from the
real aims of the operation.
Much can be learned from the way the U.S. behaved toward the Cuban
independence movement against Spain in the late 1890s--which culminated in
1898 in the "splendid little war" that made the Philippines and Puerto Rico
colonies of the U.S., and Cuba a protectorate.
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AFTER THE Civil War, the U.S. emerged as a world economic powerhouse--though
as a latecomer, its military power, political clout and colonial interests
lagged far behind that of the European powers, particularly Britain and
France.
As the end of the 19th century approached, the European powers were busy
carving up the world into colonies and spheres of influence in an effort to
secure sources of raw materials, cheap labor and protected markets. U.S.
officials, politicians and business interests began clamoring for a foreign
policy that would assert American naval and military power, particularly in
the Caribbean, Latin America and the Pacific.
"It makes the water come to my mouth when I think of the state of Cuba as one
in our family," wrote Frederick R. Coudert, a leading Wall Street figure, in
1895.
A number of American investors were coming to dominate the lucrative Cuban
sugar industry, and Cuba was seen as a strategically important island for
controlling the Caribbean.
The famed Cuban revolutionary, José Martí, who had spent some time in the
U.S. organizing a movement in exile against Spanish domination, welcomed the
political and financial support of U.S. citizens for the Cuban cause.
But he was suspicious of U.S. designs on the island, writing in his last
letter, not long before his death at the hands of his Spanish enemies in
1895: "It is my duty, inasmuch as I realize it and have the spirit to fulfill
it--to prevent, by the independence of Cuba, the United States from spreading
over the West Indies and falling, with that added weight, upon other lands of
our America. All I have done up to now, and shall do hereafter, is to that
end."
"I have lived inside the monster," he continued, referring to the U.S., "and
know its insides--and my weapon is only the slingshot of David."
The revolutionary war for Cuban independence begun by Martí and his cohorts
in 1895 had widespread support in the U.S., fanned in part by the "yellow
press" owned by media moguls like William Randolph Hearst, who supported U.S.
intervention in Cuba and used his newspapers to press for it.
No doubt, the press had much to work with in making the case against Spain.
After the triumphal march of the revolutionary armies through Cuba, Spain put
Gen. Valeriano Wyler in charge: he immediately implemented his now infamous
reconcentration plan. This decree gave eight days for all inhabitants of Cuba
to move into towns occupied by Spanish troops and forbade the transfer of
food from one place to another. The policy led to the deaths by disease and
starvation of as many as half, and possibly more, of the 500,000 to 600,000
people affected by the transfer policy.
Throughout the war, however, the U.S. under President Grover Cleveland
refused to recognize the Cuban revolutionary armies, and used its powers to
prevent the flow of men, arms and supplies to them--in effect, aiding the
Spanish. Many commentators at the time wrote of the fact that the
revolutionaries could have easily defeated the Spanish before the U.S.
invasion if they had been able to purchase munitions, food and medical
supplies from America.
Nevertheless, these under-equipped, half-starving armies of guerrilla
fighters, never totaling more than 30,000, but ably led by the likes of
Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, ran the Spanish ragged and seized control
of dozens of towns and most of the countryside. By the time the U.S. made its
decision to intervene, it was widely believed that it was only a matter of
time before the Spanish were defeated anyway.
There was a minority in the Cuban independence movement, such as Tómas
Estrada Palma, the delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party stationed in the
U.S., who supported some kind of American intervention on the grounds that
only the U.S. could establish the conditions for stability and "law and
order" necessary for Cuban business interests on the island. In the words of
historian Philip Foner, Estrada "came to favor American intervention to
prevent the revolution from becoming too revolutionary."
This argument that independence would produce chaos--and in particular, a
"race war," which was a code phrase for the dominance of Blacks--was one of
the reasons the U.S. justified both non-intervention, and then later, its
right to assert control over Cuba.
"There are...strong reasons to fear," wrote Cleveland's Secretary of State
Richard Olney, "that, once Spain were withdrawn from the island, the sold
bond of union between the different factions of the insurgents would
disappear [and] that a war of races would be precipitated."
But Estrada's support for U.S. intervention was not the position of the
majority, especially those on the ground fighting in Cuba.
"We do not need any intervention to obtain victory in more or less time,"
Antonio Maceo wrote eight months before he was killed, in December 1896, by
Wyler's troops. "Bring Cuba 25,000 to 35,000 rifles and a million
bullets...We Cubans do not need any other help."
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MACEO'S WORDS were prophetic. President William McKinley, who replaced
Cleveland, began planning a war against Spain, not to aid the Cuban
independence movement, but to gain hold of Cuba before independence could be
achieved.
The U.S. government was willing to let Spain rule so long as it guaranteed
U.S. business interests on the island. When it became clear that Spain was no
longer able to do so, that was when the U.S. decided to intervene.
The invasion was presented publicly as a humanitarian effort--"for the
purposes of extending succor," in McKinley's words--though the explosion of
the USS Maine off the coast of Havana was also milked to arouse pro-war
sentiment.
But as Foner notes, everything known about Cuba at the time pointed to the
fact that the rebels' victory was only delayed by lack of arms. If McKinley
was so concerned about the interests of humanity, he need only allow weapons
to get to the rebels. However, "such a policy would mean that Cuba would be
truly independent--independent of the United States as well as Spain--and
this was something that the administration would under no circumstances
countenance," Foner wrote.
McKinley's April 11 speech to congress announcing war with Spain was fairly
explicit in its opposition to Cuban independence: "To commit this country now
to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba may subject us to
embarrassing conditions of international obligations toward the organization
so recognized. In case of intervention, our conduct would be subjected to the
approval or disapproval of that government."
Even the way McKinley framed the issue of humanitarian intervention indicated
a desire to cut out the revolutionaries from any say in the outcome: "The
forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war,
according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical
precedents where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is
justifiable on rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint
upon both the parties to the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide
the eventual settlement."
The Cubans insisted that without any recognition by the U.S. of Cuba's
independence, they would consider any American invasion a "declaration of war
by the United States against Cuban revolutionists."
But the revolutionaries were somewhat mollified by the Teller amendment,
which stated that the U.S. "hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for
the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is
accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its
people."
This statement proved meaningless when it came to the subsequent invasion and
occupation of Cuba.
The U.S. was able to land its forces in the southeastern part of Cuba in
large part with the help of Cuban revolutionary troops under Gen. Calixto
Garcia, which prevented Spanish reinforcements from being able to move toward
the area.
Despite the indispensable role played by Cuban troops in the U.S. victory,
the U.S. press, aided by military officials, began a campaign of slander
against the rebels, saying that they were lazy, ineffective and
unhelpful--all in attempt to elevate the role of the U.S. as the sole victor
in the war.
Adding salt to the wound, Gen. William Shafter, the head of the expeditionary
forces, did not invite Gen. Garcia or any rebel officers to the official
celebration after the city of Santiago de Cuba fell. Indeed, the U.S. allowed
the Spanish administrators to continue at their posts, and forbid any Cuban
rebels from entering into the town. Garcia was so incensed that he resigned.
The same thing happened in December when the Spanish handed power over to the
Americans in Havana. The Cuban popular committees planned a five-day
celebration to congratulate the joint Cuban-American victory, complete with a
parade of Cuban revolutionary troops. The celebration was canceled by the
American general in charge, and Cuban troops were forbidden from entering the
city.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
THE U.S. army stayed in Cuba. Under Gen. Leonard Wood, the island was divided
up into military districts, each ruled by an officer and policed by a
contingent of U.S. troops.
As a condition for withdrawal (which took place in 1902), Wood insisted that
an amendment--known as the Platt Amendment--be written into the Cuban
constitution stipulating that the "the United States may exercise the right
to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a
government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual
liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by
the Treaty of Paris on the United States."
In short, the amendment gave the U.S. the right to invade Cuba whenever it
wasn't pleased with developments there. U.S. troops occupied Cuba in 1906,
1909, 1912 and between 1917 and 1923. After that, the U.S. largely protected
its interests by backing friendly dictators.
There are many important lessons to be drawn from this experience. While no
historical parallels are exact, the story of the U.S. in Cuba provides a
useful framework for understanding its intervention more than 100 years later
in Libya--and stopping us from the facile and historically unjustifiable
belief that the world's biggest, most violent, imperialist powers are capable
of exerting military force for the good of humanity.
No revolutionary movement has ever benefited from accepting military
intervention from an imperialist power--because such "support" comes at the
price of perverting the aims of the movement itself. In the words of Antonio
Maceo, "It is better to rise or fall without help than to contract debts of
gratitude to a neighbor so powerful."
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Columnist: Paul D'Amato
Paul D'Amato is managing editor of the /International Socialist Review [1]/
and author of /The Meaning of Marxism [2]/, a lively and accessible
introduction to the ideas of Karl Marx and the tradition he founded. Paul can
be contacted at pdamato@isreview.org [3].
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